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2.3 Pay level and selection to the public sector
János Köllő
This chapter is based on a study by Köllő (2013) that examines changes in 
the number and quality – as measured by their residual earnings in the pri-
vate sector – of graduates moving from private sector to public sector jobs 
as a result of the large pay increases implemented before and after the 2002 
general elections.1
The analysis is based on a large administrative panel dataset covering a rel-
atively long period (1998–2008) but limited in terms of the number of vari-
ables. It explores the development of mobility between the two sectors and 
then draws conclusions on the quality of inflows from the private to the pub-
lic sector based on the mean residual wages of those shifting from the private 
to the public sector. (Residual wage is the difference between the actual wage 
and the expected wage on the basis of gender, age and education). The analy-
sis concludes with a panel estimation that directly quantifies the relationship 
between the sectoral wage gap and private sector residual wages of workers 
moving to the public sector.
Earlier literature and methodological considerations
Surprisingly few studies examined inter-sector mobility and the selection ef-
fects of public sector wages over recent decades. Some studies draw conclu-
sions about selection effects from the between-sector earnings differentials – 
without actual data on mobility [see e.g. Foguel et al. (2012) on Brazil, Tansel 
(2005) on Turkey or Assad (1997) on Egypt]. Other studies (Bellante and 
Link, 1981, Blank, 1985) analyse selection directly, without data on wages. 
Obviously, even “lopsided” studies like these can have valid conclusions on 
the relationship between wages and selection if they can reliably estimate how 
much public sector employees would be earning in the private sector and vice 
versa. For example Stelcner, van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1989), Heitmueller 
(2006) or Gimpelson and Lukiyanova (2009) use this approach (switching re-
gression) to address this problem.
Nickell and Quintini (2002) draw conclusions from comparing time series 
of the wage gap and various quality indicators. Quality is measured as test 
results in early teenage years and they show the deterioration of these results 
alongside the weakening in the wage position of the public sector in Britain. 
Katz and Krueger (1993) find a strong positive relationship between relative 
wages in the public sector and changes in educational attainment within pub-
lic service occupations in the United States.
Borjas (2002) captures the quality of people moving to the public sector us-
ing the residual wage they achieved in the private sector, assuming that to some 
1 In the absence of data on edu-
cation, “graduate professionals” 
are defined as employees who 
worked in occupations that 
require higher education or in 
a managerial position for any 
length of time in the observed 
period between 1997 and 2008.
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extent this reflects their productivity. In this study Borjas basically provides an 
adaptation of the Roy-model (Roy, 1951, Borjas, 1987) to the issue of selection 
between the private and public sector. Thus, its main focus is the relationship 
between the quality of entrants and wage dispersion within sectors. If both 
sectors value more or less the same skills and the dispersion of wages is much 
smaller in the public sector, more productive workers will select themselves 
to the private sector, even if mean wages in the two sectors are equal – this 
is one of the key conclusions of Borjas’ version of the Roy-model. The study 
presented here also follows this approach in measuring quality, however it 
does not aim to adopt Borjas’s (2002) model mechanically because disper-
sions within sectors did not change at all in Hungary in the period observed; 
however mean wage differentials between the two sectors fluctuated within 
a very wide range. Therefore, it is worth concentrating on the effects of the 
latter and keeping the measurement method of the Borjas study.
The use of residual wage as an indicator of quality needs a qualifying note 
here. The actual wage of people moving from one sector to the other can dif-
fer from the wage that would be expected on the basis of their gender, age 
and educational attainment due to a variety of unobserved factors. Residual 
wages that are controlled for only these factors might reflect characteristics 
associated with quality, such as management position, diligence or talent, 
but they will also contain items that compensate for non-wage advantages or 
disadvantages, industry rents, trade union premiums, bonding schemes and 
other factors that divert the actual wage from actual marginal productivity. 
Of course, it cannot be posited that in the comparison of two individuals 
higher residual wage indicates higher productivity.
However changes over time in mean residual wages of people who move be-
tween sectors – especially if these changes are not trend-like – can indicate 
increases or decreases in mean productivity, particularly if there are no chang-
es or no trend-like changes in the composition of the private sector in terms 
of sub-sectors, company size, ownership or trade union membership. A large 
sudden increase or decrease in residual wages among those who move between 
sectors, in otherwise stable circumstances, is likely to indicate a positive or 
negative selection effect, which is the focus of this analysis.
Further questions can be raised. First, are there any factors, in addition to 
the pay gap, that might cause sudden changes in the composition of people 
considering a sector change? Moving to a job in the public sector can be mo-
tivated by a variety of considerations. These can include changes in risk toler-
ance or preferences to do with age and family status. (On the role of risk tol-
erance in selection between sectors see for example Bellante and Link 1981, 
Pfeifer, 2008, Buurman et al., 2009.) It is also possible that some people who 
are made redundant accept a job in the private sector, but later, when the op-
portunity arises they reconsider this decision and move to a more preferred 
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job in the public sector. And vice versa: somebody who is at risk of unemploy-
ment in the private sector, might decide to accept a job in the public sector 
immediately rather than risk unemployment, even if their preferred option 
would be a private sector job at the given wage. However, the influence of 
these factors is unlikely to fluctuate if the age distribution of the work force 
is stable (or changing steadily) and the labour market is near equilibrium. On 
the contrary, an abrupt increase in the relative pay position of the public sec-
tor makes it suddenly profitable for higher paid, more productive workers to 
move to a public sector job as well.
Secondly, it is arguable whether changes in intentions to move to another 
sector can be captured through time series on actual mobility. The supply ef-
fect can only be demonstrated from data on actual moves if public institu-
tions are intending to select the best applicants at the given pay level. This 
seems like a reasonable assumption for most jobs; apart from those positions 
that are filled according to explicitly political criteria.
Based on these considerations this study uses the following methods: we 
observe, over a long period of time (1997–2007), all cases when a graduate 
employed in the private sector in year t moves to the public sector in year 
t + 1 without any unemployment or other interruptions in between. After 
this, changes in the residual wage of people who changed sectors are exam-
ined. Finally, we estimate how the between-sector pay differential affects the 
residual wage of switchers. The procedure is presented in Annexe 2.3.
Data and variables
The Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (CANPI) has a 
centralised electronic register that holds records of contribution payments 
(“Kelen”) starting from 1997. This chapter uses a 20-per cent random sam-
ple of individuals who were registered in Kelen between 1997 and 2008; it 
includes a total of 15,464,904 annual records for 1,288,742 individuals. In 
the database there were 738 thousand individuals employed in “graduate oc-
cupations” in 1997 and 852 thousand in 2008.2 For further information on 
the sample and the key concepts see the original paper (Köllő, 2013). Here we 
only summarise how coding in the “Kelen” data base affects the definition of 
public and private sector employees and switchers.
Private sector employees are defined as employees whose income came ex-
clusively from one or several private sector jobs in a given year. Switchers are 
those who worked as public service employees or civil servants for any length 
of time in the following year, without any time spent in unemployment, on 
parental leave, or as self-employed or independent contractors.
For public sector employees the only certainty is that they worked in the 
public sector for any length of time in the given year, thus their income might 
also include earnings from the private sector. Furthermore, direct mobility 
2 The CSO Labour Force Survey 
found 773 thousand and 900 
thousand college or university 
graduates in these years. Ob-
viously some of those who are 
considered “graduates” on the 
basis of their work history do 
not have a degree, while some 
graduates would probably not 
meet the above criteria based 
on their work history. Neverthe-
less the figures are reassuringly 
similar.
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from the public to the private sector is only observed if the individual was 
employed in the private sector for the whole of the following year and had no 
other earnings. Also, particularly at the beginning of the period, it was com-
mon that public sector workers moved to the private sector without a change 
of jobs through outsourcing or privatisation. On the extent of this and job 
moves from the public to the private sector see Chapter 2.4 of this In Focus 
and for more detail Elek and Szabó’s paper (2013). Thus, shifts from the pub-
lic to the private sector are not examined in this chapter. We focus on direct 
moves from the private to the public sector.
The earnings data relate to total annual earnings subject to social insurance 
contributions while the number of qualifying days is also known. The wage 
level is measured as earnings per day and is expressed as a percentage of the 
total sample’s mean.3
Development of wages in the private and public sector
Figure 2.3.1 shows the development of the wage differential between the two 
sectors, controlled for gender, age and educational attainment, based on data 
from the Wage Tariff Survey and Kelen. In the latter case, the wages of those 
who worked for the whole year were taken into account. Based on admin-
istrative data the wage level of the public sector seems higher, but this is not 
unexpected as, unlike the Wage Tariff Survey, the Kelen data base includes 
the low-paid workers of companies with fewer than five employees. However, 
the development of the wage gap over time is similar, apart from 2004. This 
might be explained by the differences in recording earnings data: the Wage 
Tariff Survey of May 2004 recorded regular earnings in May plus 1/12 of the 
bonuses and premiums received in 2003, while Kelen records earnings in the 
year they are actually paid.4
Mobility
Public institutions can use their increased resources in a variety of ways that 
has implications for our expectations about the development of job mobil-
ity. Pay rises can – even without any additional action – slow down the exo-
dus of high-quality workforce and thus reduce entry mobility. At the same 
time public institutions could also take advantage of higher wages and recruit 
more and better workers from the private sector. (They could have done this 
all the more as the number of public sector workers – including employees in 
graduate occupations – was rising until 2005.) This latter strategy increases 
the rate of entry to the public sector and may also increase the exit rate if the 
number of jobs is held constant.
The data clearly show that wage rises during the Medgyessy and Orbán gov-
ernments increased the number of direct moves from private to public sec-
tor jobs only in 2003 (Table 2.3.1). (Note that the rows indicate the last year 
3 Information on wages for 1997 
had considerable amounts of 
missing data and seemed unreli-
able – the mean and dispersion 
are much smaller than in sub-
sequent years – therefore wage 
data for only 1998–2008 was 
used. The time-scale of employ-
ment statistics is 1997–2008, for 
mobility it is 1997–2007, and 
the analysis of the relationship 
between wages and mobility 
is for the period between 1998 
and 2007.
4 The Wage Survey records regu-
lar earnings for the month of 
May minus irregular bonuses in 
May plus the monthly average 
of irregular bonuses from the 
previous year.
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spent in the private sector, therefore moves that happened in 2003 are shown 
in the row of 2002!) The block on the left side of the table displays the unad-
justed transfer rates for everyone and also separately for people aged under 
and over 40 years. The block on the right shows year fixed effects from probit 
models that estimate the probability of transition between sectors controlled 
for gender and single years of age. Both the raw data and the estimates suggest 
that the transfer rate was slowly declining in 1998–2002, slightly increased 
in 2003, and then dropped sharply to well below any previous levels and re-
mained there, fluctuating within narrow ranges.5
It might be argued that the transfer rate could have decreased without a de-
cline in the absolute number of job movers as a result of the steady increase in 
Figure 2.3.1: The earnings advantage/disadvantage of public sector employees, 
1998–2008 (percentage points, private sector employees  
with similar observable characteristics = 0)
Note: The curve represents eβ values calculated from β parameters. For public sector 
employees some of the qualifying days might be from the private sector.
Wage Tariff Survey. Wage: Gross wage in May excluding irregular bonuses but in-
cluding 1/12 part of the total bonuses in the previous year. Sample: employees of 
companies with five or more (in 1998–1999 10 or more) employees, and public ser-
vice employees and civil servants in the public sector. Dependent variable: the loga-
rithm of wage. Control variables: gender, age, age square, educational attainment, 
number of paid working hours.
Kelen. Wage: monthly breakdown of annual earnings from employment or public 
service/civil service status. Sample: everyone who paid contributions on labour 
income for the whole year. Dependent variable: the logarithm of wage. Control 
variables: gender, dummies for single years of age, proxy for educational attainment 
(see main text).
5 The statistical tests also con-
firm that the transfer rate fell 
significantly both in the older 
and younger group in 2003. In 
earlier or later periods fluctua-
tions were not statistically sig-
nificant.
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the number of graduates employed in the private rather than the public sector. 
The data disprove this: the fall in the transfer rate was sudden and much greater 
than would have been justified by a steady decline in the relative weight of the 
public sector (that was even interrupted by a slight increase in 2002–2003). 
The question might also be raised of whether the remarkable decline in flows 
from the private sector was caused by an (implicit) hiring freeze introduced 
alongside the wage increases. This is clearly not the case because the number 
of graduates working in the public sector steadily increased from 290 thou-
sand in 2001 to 306 thousand in 2004 and only started to decrease as a result 
of austerity measures taken in 2006.
Table 2.3.1: Job moves from the private to the public sector – transfer rates  
and year fixed effects, 1997–2007 (probability that a private sector worker  
moves to a public sector job in the subsequent year)
Last year in 
the private 
sector
Unadjusted transfer ratesa Year fixed effects controlled  for gender and age
All 25–40 years 41–61 years All 25–40 years 41–61 years
1997 1.95 2.14 1.68 2.24 2.13 2.13
1998 2.08 2.21 1.89 2.40 2.19 2.45
1999 1.69 1.92 1.35 1.75 1.73 1.58
2000 1.83 2.07 1.48 1.95 1.90 1.80
2001 1.79 2.12 1.28 1.85 2.00 1.48
2002 1.97 2.35 1.41 2.13 2.34 1.69
2003 1.43 1.72 0.99 1.30 1.46 0.99
2004 1.48 1.72 1.10 1.39 1.50 1.19
2005 1.41 1.69 0.96 1.28 1.47 0.94
2006 1.34 1.57 0.97 1.18 1.32 0.96
2007 1.25 1.45 0.93 reference
a Transfers to public sector as a percentage of private sector workers.
b Probit marginal effects at the sample mean, percentage.
Dependent variable: worked in the public sector for any length of time in the subse-
quent year.
Independent variables: gender, age, age square, dummies for single years of age. All 
year effects are significant at 0.01 level.
Table 2.3.2 presents time series data on mobility from the public to the pri-
vate sector in a similar structure to Table 2.3.1; however it must be empha-
sised that these data differ from data on moves in the opposite direction. The 
slump in 2002 is clearly noticeable in the total sample as well as in the older 
and younger groups. Job moves from the public to the private sector – and 
any vacancies as a result – decreased considerably: in the four years when 
the public sector paid high wages, moves to the private sector were over 30 
per cent lower than either before or after. The increase later, in 2006–2007 
could already be related to the redundancies that had begun to commence 
in the public sector.
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Table 2.3.2: Job mobility from the public to the private sector, 1997–2007  
(the probability that somebody who [also] worked in the public sector  
in year t would have earnings only from the private sector in year t + 1)
Last year in 
the public 
sector
Unadjusted transfer rates (percentage) Year fixed effects controlling  for gender and agea
All 25–40 years 41–61 years All 25–40 years 41–61 years
1997 4.63 5.90 3.05 3.29 4.34 2.31
1998 3.92 5.38 2.19 2.45 3.62 1.32
1999 3.96 5.35 2.42 2.59 3.57 1.64
2000 4.17 5.81 2.41 2.90 4.18 1.68
2001 3.59 5.05 2.10 2.24 3.20 1.33
2002 2.64 3.83 1.46 1.04 1.57 0.51
2003 3.00 4.40 1.62 1.54 2.36 0.80
2004 3.03 4.32 1.79 1.64 2.30 1.06
2005 2.90 4.21 1.66 1.50 2.22 0.88
2006 3.55 5.12 2.08 2.41 3.52 1.46
2007 3.39 4.85 2.05 benchmark year
a Probit marginal effects at the sample mean, percentage.
Dependent variable: only has earnings from the private sector in the subsequent year.
Independent variables: gender, age, age squared, dummies for single year of age. All 
year effects are significant at the level of 0.01.
Wages of job movers in the public sector
The wages of job movers are first examined using repeated cross-sectional re-
gressions. Table 2.3.3 indicates that the daily wage of graduate job movers 
controlled for gender, age and working time (“residual” hereafter) was 2.5–8 
per cent lower, than the daily wage of stayers in 1998–2001, and the differ-
ence was significant at 0.05 in three out of the four years.6
The number of observations increased at a steady rate over time: ranging 
from 91,439 to 116,682 in the full sample, from 49,480 to 69,944 in the 
younger group and between 44,756 and 50,139 in the older group.
In the years of large pay rises (2002–2004) the wage of movers – as expected – 
exceeded the wage of stayers by 4.4–5.6 per cent. However, alongside the decline 
in the relative wage level of the public sector this advantage first disappeared 
and then in 2007 turned into a significant and rather large 6.6 per cent disad-
vantage. It would be difficult to attribute the sudden changes to anything else 
than the temporarily high public sector pay, which made it profitable for high 
earner private sector employees to move to the public sector. Public institutions 
used positive selection and chose applicants that appeared to be more productive.
The development of residual wages over time in the younger and the older 
age groups was similar, however according to estimations by age group the 
selection patterns were different. Earnings of young movers (aged 25–40) 
were below the earnings of stayers in each year. Their disadvantage was sta-
tistically significant and substantial (10–16 per cent) in 1998–2001. During 
6 The coefficients show the wage 
advantage or disadvantage of 
employees moving between sec-
tors in logarithm points. For ex-
ample, the value in the upper left 
corner indicates that the wage 
of people moving between sec-
tors is 0.0512 logarithm points 
– or approximately 5.1 per cent 
– higher than the wage of stay-
ers all other things being equal.
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the pay rises of the Orbán and Medgyessy governments, this gap disappeared 
and the group of movers was comprised of average earners. However, the gap 
re-appeared with the decline in public sector pay in 2005–2007 and movers 
– increasingly – came from the lower tail of the wage distribution.
Table 2.3.3: Wage premium/disadvantage of graduate job movers from the private 
to the public sector compared to stayers in the private sector, controlled for gender, 
age and number of years worked (logarithmic point, linear regression coefficients 
estimated with the method of ordinary least squares)
Last year in the 
private sector Full sample
Younger people  
(25–40 years)
Older people  
(41 years and over)
1998 –0.0512** (2.33) –0.1082*** (3.65) 0.0233 (0.74)
1999 –0.0824*** (3.36) –0.1609*** (5.10) 0.0478 (1.28)
2000 –0.0239 (1.04) –0.1095*** (3.70) 0.1149*** (3.22)
2001 –0.0696*** (3.30) –0.1427*** (5.65) 0.0811** (2.31)
2002 0.0448** (2.35) –0.0360 (1.55) 0.2066*** (6.48)
2003 0.0442* (1.94) –0.0119 (0.43) 0.1685*** (4.32)
2004 0.0550*** (2.49) –0.0159 (0.59) 0.2016*** (5.35)
2005 –0.0104 (0.46) –0.0782*** (2.93) 0.1580*** (3.93)
2006 –0.0285 (1.27) –0.1058*** (3.90) 0.1427*** (3.74)
2007 –0.0655*** (2.95) –0.1334*** (4.93) 0.0757* (1.99)
Note: t-values in parentheses.
Dependent variable: the logarithm of daily earnings.
Independent variables: male, dummies for single year of age variables, days in work 
during the year, dummy for movers set to 1 if the individual worked in the public 
sector in the subsequent year and 0 otherwise).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In the older group, movers’ earnings exceeded that of stayers in each year, al-
though the difference was not yet significant in 1998–1999. During the time 
of large pay rises the average residual wage of older switchers jumped to 20 per 
cent. It then started to fall and drop below 8 per cent in 2007.
So far the argument that fluctuations in the residual wage of movers were 
related to variations in the sectoral pay gap was based on the similarity in their 
time series. The following sections will attempt to show – using the panel 
equation presented in Annexe 2.3 (A2.3.1) – that there is a direct relation-
ship between them. First, we form K = 640 groups of private sector work-
ers on the basis of their gender, single year of age and calendar years. Second, 
we regress the wages of private sector workers on a set of controls, a MOVER 
dummy and its interaction with the deviation of the kth group’s annual aver-
age public sector pay (wkt) from its intertemporal average (wk). The coefficient 
of the MOVER dummy measures the average difference between movers and 
stayers. The coefficient for the interaction term [MOVER ´  (wkt – wk)] measures 
how fluctuations in the public sector pay of a given group affect the residual 
wages of movers (relative to stayers) in that group.
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The estimated wage equation is controlled for gender, age, age square, the 
number of days in work during the year and calendar year fixed effects – the 
coefficients of these variables are not presented here. Younger and older age 
groups are distinguished on the basis of their year of birth rather than their 
age – to make sure that categories are stable. The two age groups are: people 
younger than 40 years in 2003 and anyone older than this.7
As for the results presented in Table 2.3.4: according to estimations for 
the full sample, the difference between the wages of movers and stayers en-
tirely depended on variations in earnings potential in the public sector. The 
wage of stayers is only 0.85 per cent higher if the level of public sector pay is 
at its intertemporal mean. By contrast, if the public sector wage is 10 per cent 
higher in a group than its intertemporal mean, the residual wage of movers is 
increased by approximately 6 per cent compared to stayers.
Table 2.3.4: The effect of public sector pay level on the wages of people moving from 
the private to the public sector, 1998–2007 (panel estimation assuming individual 
random effects and using the method of least squares)
Full sample Younger peoplea Older peopleb
β1: MOVER 0.0085** (2.00) –0.0213*** (3.76) 0.0364*** (5.86)
β2: MOVER × (ln wKkt – ln w¯Kk)c 0.5780*** (8.14) 0.6280*** (7.55) 0.3975*** (2.71)
Internal R2 0.0422 0.0613 0.0052
External R2 0.0727 0.0611 0.0452
Total R2 0.0622 0.0663 0.0292
Mean number of years observed 6.7 6.5 7.0
Number of observations 1,313,629 783,390 530,239
Number of individuals 207,597 126,222 81,375
Dependent variable: logarithm of relative wage.
Sample: private sector employees.
a Born before 1963.
b Born after 1963.
c : (wKkt – w¯Kk) deviation of the mean wage in group k (based on gender and age) in year t 
from the intertemporal (between 1998 and 2007) mean wage in the public sector.
Z values in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The effect of public sector wages is much stronger in the group of younger 
people born after 1963 than in the older group: elasticity is above 0.6 in the 
first group while it is below 0.4 in the second. This is most probably related to 
the fact that people who move to a public sector job at an older age are more 
likely to be at a senior level. Some of the moves might be part of politically 
motivated reshuffles of senior government officials or people might move to 
the public sector as elected officials.
7 The estimation was carried 
out using GLS panel regression 
assuming random effects for the 
reasons presented in the discus-
sion of equation (A2.3.1). Due to 
the presence of predicted vari-
ables in the equation, standard 
errors were estimated with a 
500-step bootstrap method also 
taking into account that there 
are multiple, possibly correlated 
observations for each individual. 
Therefore we adjust the standard 
errors for “clustering by indi-
viduals”.
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Conclusions
The substantial increase of public sector pay – first for civil servants, then for 
public service workers – in 2002–2003 made the sector more attractive even 
for higher paid private sector workers. At the same time thanks to the large 
pay rises, which were not accompanied by redundancies, the number of em-
ployees leaving the public sector for a job in the private sector fell and so did 
the number of vacancies. Public institutions could hire fewer people from a 
pool of better quality applicants and this lead to an improvement in the qual-
ity – as measured by the residual wage – of new entrants.
With the erosion of the wage advantage from 2002 and the “slimming 
down” of the public sector that started in 2006, the number of people com-
ing from the private sector continued to decline as well as their overall qual-
ity. The large pay rise temporarily – for three years strongly and for a further 
two years moderately – improved the composition of workers moving to the 
public sector, however any positive effect on the public sector workforce was 
limited by a large fall in the entry rate – to two thirds of its previous level. The 
public sector could have benefited more from the higher wage level if at the 
same time it would have “sifted through” its existing workforce.
Measures introduced during the economic crisis – especially the abolition 
of the additional 13th month salary and an unofficial but effective pay freeze 
– pushed the relative pay level of the public sector into a low not seen since 
the early 1990s. Considering Hungary’s current growth and fiscal prospects 
it is unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. At the time of 
writing this chapter, in 2013, the wage level of the public sector was 20 per 
cent below the private sector for people of the same gender, age and educa-
tional attainment – this has been unprecedented since 1996, the second year 
of the Bokros package.
Based on the estimations presented in this study it is expected that the 
public sector will become even less attractive for workers, and it is likely that 
much of this deterioration has already happened. (Of course there is no way 
to verify this prediction until micro data covering 2013 is available.) At the 
same time it is unclear whether a general pay rise similar to 2002 would 
lead to the desired outcome: improvement in the quality of the public sec-
tor workforce. In addition to pay rises, this also requires selection based on 
performance and skills.
Annexe 2.3
The effect of the fluctuation of public sector wage on the residual wage of mov-
ers was estimated with the following panel regression:
 ln w Mikt = αXikt + β1moverikt + β2moverikt × (A2.3.1) 
 × (lnw¯ Kkt – lnw¯ Kk ) + γt + uikt 
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The left side of the equation represents the annual income from year t for ith 
private sector worker in group k, Xikt includes the indicators of gender, age 
and working time, and t is a set of dummy variables for calendar years. The up-
per case K (public sector) and M (private sector) indicate the two sectors. We 
distinguish those who are known to have worked in the public sector in year 
t + 1 (MOVER). The expression wkt – wk measures to what extent the mean pub-
lic sector wage of a given group differs from its own intertemporal mean. For 
the estimation we calculate mean public sector pay for 640 age years × gen-
der × year interactions. Separate estimations are carried out for younger and 
older workers.
The estimation was carried out using the method of generalised least squares 
(GLS), assuming random effects. A fixed effects model would not answer the 
question that we are interested in – are higher paid people selected if public 
sector wages are temporarily high – but would answer the question of whether 
the wage of movers increases in the year of move compared to their own per-
sonal average if the pay advantage (disadvantage) of the public sector is grow-
ing (falling) compared to its mean advantage (disadvantage). In other words: 
our aim is not to filter out but to measure the selection bias arising from the 
non-random selection of movers.
The reason why the wage component in the interactive term is defined in 
the way it has been is that we only want to capture the variance of group-level 
average wages over time. (In an equation that uses the public sector pay vari-
able without removing the mean, parameter β2 would simply measure that 
the wage of movers is likely to be higher in groups where wages are high in 
both sectors. In the equation (A2.3.1) β1 measures the mean residual wage of 
movers, while β2 measures the effect of fluctuations in public sector pay on 
the selection of movers.
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